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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Article 7 of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Right 
(TRIPS Agreement)
2
  is entitled ‘Objectives’ and states that: - 
 
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should 
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and 
dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users 
of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and 
economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations. 
 
 
It is clear from this provision that the protection and enforcement of intellectual 
property rights aims to serve the broader interests of society by encouraging innovation 
and the transfer of that knowledge to others. Yet, Article 7 reflects more than just the 
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 (adopted 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995) 1869 UNTS 299. 
 2 
intellectual property ‘bargain’ within the international arena. Supported by Article 8 and 
the preamble to the Agreement, Article 7 would appear to confirm that broader social 
and economic development interests are of vital concern to the Agreement and its 
negotiators.
3
 The balance of interests between producers and users is to be mutually 
advantageous; rights and obligations arising both within and beyond the Agreement are 
to be appropriately reconciled; and socio-economic welfare more generally is to be a 
guiding objective for all TRIPS compliant regimes. Both Article 7 and its neighbour 
Article 8 have long been promoted as key to introducing a more balanced perspective to 
intellectual property protection at the international level, thereby forming the lens 
through which other provisions of the Agreement are to be defined.
4
  This perspective 
                                                 
3
 Article 8, entitled ‘Principles’, states that: - 
1. Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations, adopt measures necessary 
to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital 
importance to their socio-economic and technological development, provided that such measures 
are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement. 
2. Appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement, 
may be needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by rights holders or the resort 
to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of 
technology. 
The preamble, for example, ‘Recognis[es] the underlying public policy objectives of national systems for 
the protection of intellectual property, including developmental and technological objectives.’ 
4
 Many WTO Member States, in particular developing countries, have sought to rely on Article 7 (and 
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 3 
makes Articles 7 and 8 vital components of the interpretative process. However, the 
legal relevance of Article 7 has been somewhat limited by the perceived ambiguities of 
its language.
5
 This may have undermined its legal recognition, with Article 7 being 
afforded only limited recognition from the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO). In fact, relatively few disputes involving the TRIPS 
Agreement have been brought before the DSB and only a small number of the resulting 
reports actually mention Articles 7 and/or 8.
 6
 Yet, despite the limited material upon 
which to draw, it is possible to identify two seemingly distinct approaches to these 
provisions.  
                                                                                                                                              
Principles of the TRIPS Agreement’ (2009) 46 Houston L. Rev. 979, 1022; Carlos M Correa, Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: A Commentary on the TRIPS Agreement (OUP 2007) 93.  
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undermine their legal application given that many legal concepts are somewhat vague, for example that 
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6
 Total number of complaints proceeding to a Panel ruling is ten, with two of the complaints being on the 
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Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging - Request for the Establishment of a Panel 
by Ukraine (17 August 2012) WT/DS434/11; Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Honduras (17 
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 In the first line of decisions, the tribunals adopt a position that identifies Article 7, 
as well as Article 8, as mere expressions of the inherent characteristics of the 
international intellectual property system. In this role these provisions have little, if any, 
legal value in their own right. For example, the panel in Canada – Patent Protection of 
Pharmaceutical Products
7
 appears to accept that both Articles 7 and 8 are simply 
illustrative of the balancing of goals that had already occurred during treaty 
negotiations, and thus irrelevant for defining the scope of other provisions of the 
Agreement.  
 However, a second line of decisions adopts a contrary perspective by 
acknowledging that Articles 7 and 8 may have a legally active function within the 
TRIPS regime. The Appellate Body in Canada – Term of Patent Protection leaves the 
door open for their future application by acknowledging that: - 
[O]ur findings in this appeal do not in any way prejudge the applicability of 
Article 7 or Article 8 of the TRIPS Agreement in possible future cases with 
respect to measures to promote the policy objectives of the WTO Members 
that are set out in those Articles. Those Articles still await appropriate 
interpretation.
8
 
 
                                                 
7
 WTO, Canada: Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products – Report of the Panel (17 March 2000) 
WT/DS114/R (Canada – Pharmaceuticals). 
8
 WTO, Canada: Term of Patent Protection – Report of the Appellate Body (18 September 2000) 
WT/DS170/AB/R (Canada - Patent Term) [101]. 
 5 
Yet, it is the decision in United States – Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 
1998 that is most significant in delineating a future role for Article 7.
9
 Here the Panel 
takes the first steps in defining how this provision should be interpreted by identifying 
Article 7 as ‘a form of the good faith principle.’ In this regard, the Panel report provides 
an important explanation of the function of Article 7 that was not disavowed by the 
Appellate Body in its final report. By identifying Article 7 as ‘a form of the good faith 
principle’, the Panel expressly introduces into the TRIPS Agreement a good faith 
obligation for all WTO Member States when implementing TRIPS, and a good faith 
obligation for all those interpreting the Agreement.  
The good faith principle has been recognised within international law as 
incorporating concepts beyond the mere subjective belief of a party to a dispute
10
 and is 
of greater influence than the vague, ‘open-ended’ ancillary notions of good faith that 
could equally be replaced with other equally general terms such as ‘reasonableness’ or 
‘fairness’.11 Within international law, good faith acquires most significance as a general 
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 WTO, United States: Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998 – Report of the Panel (6 August 
2001) WT/DS176/R (US – s211). 
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principle of law and a principle of customary international law
12
 that, as recognised by 
the Appellate Body in United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products, ‘controls the exercise of rights by states.’13 This general principle has, 
over time, spawned a more precise series of international obligations and corresponding 
rights for both states and international organisations.
14
 And whilst the WTO Appellate 
Body has shown reluctance to establish that a Member has failed to act in good faith,
15
 
it has demonstrated a willingness to review a Member State’s actions for compliance 
with the principle, especially where textual support for such an approach can be found 
within the WTO Agreements themselves.
16
 Several provisions have been identified by 
the Panel and the Appellate Body as implying a good faith obligation or as expressing 
the principle of good faith, these include the chapeau of Article XX of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT);
17
 the term ‘objective examination’ in 
Article 3.1 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General 
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 Schwarzenberger describes good faith as one of the ‘seven fundamental principles’ of international 
law, Georg Schwarzenberger and E D Brown, A Manual of International Law, 6th edition (London, 
1969) 35-36. The international Court of Justice has described the principle of good faith as ‘One of the 
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Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v France) [1974] ICJ Rep 253, 268. Marion Panizzon, Good Faith in the 
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Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Anti-Dumping Agreement);
18
 paragraph 2 of 
Annex II to the Anti-Dumping Agreement;
19
 and, most importantly for this study, 
Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement. This is a significant development. Whilst, the 
TRIPS Agreement does make explicit reference to the requirement of ‘good faith’ at 
several points,
20
 none of these provisions impose a good faith obligation directly upon 
Member States. They are concerned only with ensuring that the activities of individuals 
within the state satisfy a requirement of good faith.
21
 As a result, it is the Panel’s 
interpretation of Article 7 which expressly imposes the first good faith obligation of the 
TRIPS Agreement for Member States.
22
  
The implications of this decision are important in relation to both the role of the 
good faith principle within the TRIPS Agreement and the function of Article 7. First, 
this decision accepts that the operationalisation of Article 7 is to arise through the 
application of good faith jurisprudence, thereby establishing Article 7 as the legal basis 
for the good faith obligation. Secondly, it shapes our understanding of good faith in the 
context of the TRIPS Agreement. As a form of the good faith principle, Article 7 acts as 
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19
 Ibid [101]. For an analysis of the reasoning of the WTO Appellate Body on the issue of good faith see 
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 The TRIPS Agreement makes explicit reference to the requirement of ‘good faith’ at articles 24.4, 
24.5, 48.2 and 58(c). In addition, several provisions seek to prevent the ‘abuse of intellectual property 
rights’ and the abuse of intellectual property enforcement procedures, see articles 8.2, 40.2, 41.1, 48.1, 
50.3 and 53.1. 
21
 Mitchell (n 13) 353. 
22
 Panizzon (n 11) 61. 
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a safeguard against the potential arbitrary regulation of intellectual property by WTO 
Members. More particularly, this is achieved by importing into the TRIPS Agreement 
corollary good faith principles, such as abus de droit, legitimate expectations, and 
interpretative objectives such as the principle of effectiveness. In fact, in the legal 
application of good faith, Article 7 may actually take on a substantive role in defining 
the Agreement’s terms and obligations. At the very least, the Panel decision in US – 
s211 reinforces the importance of Article 7 as an interpretative tool and finally sees 
Article 7 acknowledged judicially as an effective source of legal obligations within the 
international intellectual property system. As will be demonstrated below, the recent 
complaints made by several WTO Member States against Australian legislation 
mandating plain packaging for tobacco products provides the ideal scenario to 
demonstrate the impact the US-s211 Panel’s decision could and should have on future 
cases.  
 
II. UNITED STATES – SECTION 211 OMNIBUS APPROPRIATIONS ACT 
OF 1998 
 
The decision of the WTO Dispute Settlement Panel US - s 211 provides an interesting, 
but as yet under appreciated,
23
 explanation of the function of Article 7 of the TRIPS 
Agreement. This dispute was initiated by the European Communities to address the 
consistency of section 211 of the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998 with the 
obligations arising under the TRIPS Agreement and the Paris Convention for the 
                                                 
23
 For a brief discussion on the relevance of this decision see Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, ‘The (Non) 
Use of Treaty Object and Purpose in Intellectual Property Disputes in the WTO’ in Sustainable 
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 9 
Protection of Industrial Property (Paris Convention).
24
 The United States had 
introduced this provision to prevent the registration and enforcement of trade marks and 
trade names that had been confiscated by the Cuban government during the early 1960s.  
 The origins of the WTO dispute lay in a lengthy legal battle between two 
commercial organisations that both claimed trade mark and trade name protection for 
‘Havana Club’ in the United States. In 1993, the French company, Pernod-Ricard, 
entered into a joint venture agreement with the Cuban government, forming Havana 
Club Holding (HCH), in order to make and export rum worldwide under the Havana 
Club name. Four years later, Barcadi acquired the original proprietary interests in 
Havana Club from the Arechabala family, who had owned the business prior to its 
seizure by the Cuban government. During this period, Barcardi also successfully 
lobbied the US Congress to have section 211 included in the Omnibus Appropriations 
Act of 1998. The effect was to retroactively invalidate any rights by the Cuban 
Government or its assignees to the Havana Club trade mark in the United States. In an 
infringement action brought by HCH, both the District Court of New York and the 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held, inter alia, that section 211 prevented 
HCH from exercising any legal rights to the Havana Club name.
25
 In July 1999 the 
matter was advanced by the European Union before the WTO. The EU claimed that US 
legislation, in particular section 211, actively discriminated against the trade mark 
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rights of certain foreign nationals and, therefore, was contrary to several provisions in 
both the TRIPS Agreement and the Paris Convention.
26
  
In analysing the consistency of section 211 with WTO law, the Panel makes a 
significant contribution to our understanding of the role of Article 7 of the TRIPS 
Agreement and the function of the good faith principle within the TRIPS Agreement. 
The Report acknowledges that national legislation might arbitrarily regulate intellectual 
property ownership and, in that instance, Article 7 may act as a safeguard to protect 
against such abuse. The Panel notes that: - 
 [A]rticle 7 of the TRIPS Agreement states that one of the objectives is that 
“[t]he protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should 
contribute...to a balance of rights and obligations.” We consider this 
expression to be a form of the good faith principle. The Appellate Body in 
United States – Shrimps stated that this principle “controls the exercise of 
rights by states. One application of this principle, the doctrine widely 
known as the doctrine of abus de droit, prohibits the abusive exercise of a 
state’s rights and enjoins that whenever the assertion of a right ‘impinges on 
the field covered by [a] treaty obligation, it must be exercised bona fide, 
that is to say reasonably.’ An abusive exercise by a Member of its own 
treaty right thus results in a breach of the treaty rights of the other members 
and, as well, a violation of the treaty obligation of the Member so acting.” 
Members must therefore implement the provisions of the TRIPS 
                                                 
26
 Violation was claimed of TRIPS Articles 2.1, 3.1, 4, 15.1, 16.1, and 42 in conjunction with violations 
under the Paris Convention, Articles 2(1), 6bis(1), 6quinquies A(1)  and 8. US-s211 (n 8) [3.1]-[3.4]. 
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Agreement in a manner consistent with the good faith principle 
enshrined in Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement.
27
 
 
 Notwithstanding a lack of explicit application of this reasoning by the Panel
28
 and an 
Appellate Body decision that does not directly address the relevance of Article 7,
29
 the 
recognition of Article 7 as an expression of the good faith principle should heighten the 
profile of this provision and define the application of the good faith principle in the 
context of the TRIPS Agreement.  As recognised by the International Court of Justice, 
‘One of the basic principles governing the creation and performance of legal 
obligations, whatever their source, is the principle of good faith.’30 Although the 
                                                 
27
 US – s211 (n 8) [8.57] (emphasis added).  The panel quoted from the Appellate Body Report, US - 
Shrimp (n 12) [158].  
28
 In analysing the consistency of section 211 with article 15.1 of the TRIPS Agreement, the Panel 
accepts that article 15.2 allows Member States to deny registration on ‘other grounds’ including grounds 
relating to conditions of ownership. Beyond recognising that safeguards exist within the TRIPS 
Agreement to prevent potential abuse, the Panel makes no further attempt to scrutinize United States’ law 
for compliance with the principle of good faith as enshrined in Article 7. US – s211 (n 8) [8.55]-[8.60]. 
29
 WTO, United States: Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998 – Report of the Appellate Body 
(2 January 2002) WT/DS176/AB/R. In relation to art 15.1 of the TRIPS Agreement, the AB upheld the 
Panel’s decision, confirming that WTO Members have the right to determine their own conditions of 
filing and registration, including those relating to ownership and the registration of confiscated marks. 
However, the AB overrules the Panel on several of its key findings, holding that the TRIPS Agreement 
obliges Member States to provide adequate protection for trade names; and that the US legislation 
violated the national treatment and most-favoured-nation principles as it applied only to Cuban nationals 
and not to nationals from the US or any other Member State.     
30
 Nuclear Tests Case (n 11) [46]. 
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principle of good faith is today understood to be included  implicitly in international 
treaties,
31
 by expressly associating the principle with Article 7 the WTO Panel actually 
compels consideration of certain ‘Objectives’ as expressed within this provision when 
both implementing and interpreting the Agreement.  
 
III. ARTICLE 7 AND THE GOOD FAITH PRINCIPLE: DEFINING THE 
SCOPE OF THE OBLIGATION 
 
To fully understand the implications of the Panel’s decision  it is necessary, first, to 
delineate which of the objectives mentioned within Article 7 operate as an expression of 
the good faith principle and, secondly, to define the legal principles that operate to 
shape the scope of this good faith obligation.  
In addressing the first issue, the Panel appears to qualify the boundaries of the 
good faith obligation contained within Article 7.  This provision is entitled ‘Objectives’ 
in the plural, and explicitly requires that the protection and enforcement of intellectual 
property rights should contribute to ‘the promotion of technological innovation’; ‘the 
transfer and dissemination of technology’; ‘the mutual advantage of producers and 
users of technological knowledge’; ‘and in a manner conducive to social and economic 
welfare’; ‘and to a balance of rights and obligations.’ Although, the Panel requires that 
all Members must implement the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement in accordance 
with the principle of good faith enshrined in Article 7,  it  chose to only identify that 
‘the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to...a 
                                                 
31
 Antony D’Amato, ‘Good Faith’ in R. Bernhardt (ed), Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, Vol 
II (Elsevier 1995) 600. 
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balance of rights and obligations’ was a form of the good faith principle. We can 
therefore assume that the implied principle of good faith as identified by the Panel is 
limited to this phrase. It does not, as has been suggested, directly “impl[y] a good faith 
constraint on intellectual property rights where they might be seen to undermine the 
goal of “social and economic welfare.””32 Thus, the balance envisaged by Articles 7 is 
limited to reconciling the competing rights and obligations arising under the TRIPS 
Agreement and not to invoking a broader range of interests from beyond the WTO 
texts. That being said, we should not rush to conclude that the application of this 
expression of good faith will not have a positive impact upon ‘social and economic’ 
welfare within Member States, as will be discussed in more detail below.  
Turning to the second point above, in defining the application of this good faith 
obligation, the Panel draws upon the decision of the Appellate Body in US – Shrimp to 
affirm that the wider notion of good faith ‘controls the exercise of rights by states’ and 
that ‘members must therefore implement the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement in a 
manner consistent with the good faith principle enshrined in Article 7.’33 Here the Panel 
implicitly acknowledges that the good faith obligation imposed by Article 7 derives 
from a particular emanation of the wider good faith principle within treaty relations, 
that of pacta sunt servanda.
34
 In addition, the Panel goes on to identify the doctrine of 
                                                 
32Aditi Bagchi, ‘Compulsory Licensing and the Duty of Good Faith in TRIPS’ (2002-2003) 55 Stan. L. 
Rev 1529, 1542. 
33
 US - s211 (n 8) (emphasis added). 
34
 As noted by O’Connor, ‘The principle of good faith in international law is a fundamental principle 
from which the rule pacta sunt servanda and other legal rules distinctively and directly related to 
honesty, fairness and reasonableness are derived.’ John O’Connor, Good Faith in International Law 
(Aldershot, Dartmouth 1991) 124.  
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abus de droit as being a particular application of the principle of good faith that 
‘prohibits the abusive exercise of a state’s rights.’35  
 What is more, flowing directly from the general principle of good faith and the rule 
of pacta sunt servanda is the principle of treaty interpretation in good faith, as codified 
in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969.
36
 As noted by 
Sinclair, ‘If ‘good faith’ is required of the parties in relation to the observance of 
treaties, logic demands that ‘good faith’ be applied to the interpretation of treaties.’37 
Therefore, one cannot adequately consider the good faith obligations of Member States 
without an appreciation of the obligations that the principle of good faith creates for 
those that are employed to interpret the Treaty. As will be shown in the following 
discussion, Article 7, as a form of the good faith principle, encompasses both aspects of 
the good faith obligation - the regulatory and the interpretative. Moreover, by 
connecting the principle of good faith to Article 7 the Panel transforms this provision 
into the legal basis of the obligation.
38
 Consequently, by focussing on accepted good 
faith jurisprudence of the WTO a clearer picture emerges as to the correct ‘balance of 
rights and obligations’ required by Article 7, which ultimately helps to define the actual 
                                                 
35
 US - s211 (n 8) [8.57]. 
36
 ILC, ‘Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1966, Volume II’ (1966) UN Doc 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.1, 221 [12]. 
37
 Ian Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (2
nd
 edn, Manchester University Press 
1984) 119. Also, as noted by the International Law Commission, ‘the interpretation of treaties in good 
faith and according to law is essential if the pacta sunt servanda rule is to have any real meaning.’ ILC (n 
35) 119.  
38
 Whether or not in an attempt to introduce important legal principles into the TRIPS Agreement without 
subjecting the WTO Dispute Settlement Body to accusations of judicial activism. See the discussion at 
page 34.  
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meaning and function of this provision. As will become apparent below, the 
requirement of a good faith interpretation of treaties; the doctrine of abus de droit; and 
the principle of legitimate expectations, all work to inform our understanding of the 
application of the good faith principle within the confines of the TRIPS Agreement.  
 
 
 
A. Article 7: A Benchmark for Compliance with Pacta Sunt Servanda.  
 
The obligation for Member States to conduct treaty relations in good faith is well 
established within international law. This fundamental legal principle has been codified 
in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which states that ‘Every treaty in 
force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.’39 
Accordingly, the principle of pacta sunt servanda ‘determines and offers an 
authoritative regulation for the parties’ conduct.’40 With regard to treaties ‘in force’, it 
not only creates a legal obligation for member states to put into effect the rules and 
principles arising under the treaty, but to do so in good faith. This requires States to 
implement their obligations in a way that pays due respect to the purpose of the treaty, 
so that the intentions of the Parties can be realised.
41
 Consequently, Member States 
must refrain from any action which would defeat a treaty’s object and purpose.42  
                                                 
39
 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 
art 26. 
40
 Mark E Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, (Martinus 
Nijhoff, 2009) 365. 
41
 The Gabčίkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) (Judgement) [1997] ICJ Rep 7, 78-79. 
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 The Panel in US-s211 states that ‘Members must implement the provisions of the 
TRIPS Agreement in a manner consistent with the good faith principle enshrined in 
Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement’ thereby expressly incorporating the principle of 
pacta sunt servanda into the TRIPS Agreement. This in itself is not a significant 
development given that the WTO Appellate Body has already acknowledged the 
importance of the principle for the WTO Treaty.
43
 Yet, by connecting the principle to a 
specific TRIPS provision the Panel appears to sanction the use of Article 7 as a legal 
benchmark for regulating Member States behaviour for compliance with the good faith 
obligation. Thus, satisfaction of the good faith principle, in the context of the TRIPS 
Agreement, requires that ‘the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights 
should contribute to a balance of rights and obligations.’ The practical implications of 
this development become apparent in the following analysis, when we examine the 
particular applications of the good faith principle that are both expressed and implied 
from the statement of the Panel in US-s211.   
 
B.  ‘A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith’ 
 
If Members must implement their TRIPS obligations in accordance with the good faith 
principle enshrined within Article 7 it thus follows that those interpreting the rights and 
duties arising under the Agreement must do so in accordance with the good faith 
                                                                                                                                              
42
 ILC (n 35) 211[4]; Zeitler (n 18) 730.  
43
 The WTO Appellate Body has acknowledged that the principle of pacta sunt servanda forms an 
essential part of WTO jurisprudence. WTO, United States: Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 
2000 – Report of the Appellate Body (16 January 2003) WT/DS217/AB/R. The principle also finds 
expression in Article XVI.4 of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation.  
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principle. Therefore the question arises as to what good faith interpretation in 
accordance with Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement requires? 
 The legal text of the dispute settlement system of the WTO, the Understanding on 
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU),
44
 provides that all 
WTO agreements are to be interpreted ‘in accordance with customary rules of 
interpretation of public international law.’45 The Appellate Body, in its first ever ruling, 
confirmed that the interpretative rules and principles of public international law, as 
expressed in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, are binding on the WTO 
when interpreting all covered agreements.
46   
 Article 31.1 of the Vienna Convention, in codifying the ‘General Rule of 
Interpretation’, states that ‘A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with 
the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light 
of its object and purpose.’ Notwithstanding that Article 31 represents a single rule of 
treaty interpretation the process of its application is multifactorial. The formula that it 
establishes for treaty interpretation is made up of several key principles.  First, the 
interpretation has to be in good faith. Secondly, the ordinary or natural meaning of the 
treaty terms is the presumed intention of the parties. Thirdly, the ordinary or natural 
meaning of the treaty term is to be determined in the context of the treaty and in light of 
                                                 
44
 (adopted 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995) 1869 UNTS 401. 
45
 Ibid, art 3.2. 
46
 WTO, United States: Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline – Report of the Appellate 
Body (29 April 1996) WT/DS2/AB/R, 15-16. 
In fact, the Appellate Body has been willing to overturn Panel decisions for misapplying the 
interpretative rules of the Vienna Convention, WTO, India: Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and 
Agricultural Chemical Products – Report of the Appellate Body (19 December 1997) WT/DS50/AB/R 
[43]-[48]. 
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its object and purpose. Both the first and the last aspects of Article 31.1 link the analysis 
of treaty interpretation to Article 7: a) Article 7 is a form of the good faith principle and 
b) Article 7, together with its neighbour Article 8 entitled ‘Principles’, are important 
indicators of the object and purpose of the TRIPS Agreement. As reaffirmed by the 
2001 Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, ‘each 
provision of the TRIPS Agreement shall be read in the light of the object and purpose of 
the Agreement as expressed, in particular, in its objectives and principles.’47 The 
reference to ‘objectives’ and ‘principles’ has been taken as explicit recognition of the 
role that both Articles 7 and 8 can play in the interpretative process. This role is 
heightened for Article 7 in being an expression of the good faith principle.  
 
Good Faith Interpretation: A ‘Holistic’ Analysis 
 
A good faith interpretation in accordance with Article 31.1 of the Vienna Convention 
can be identified as one that takes a holistic approach to the interpretative process. Thus 
good faith interpretation can be seen to incorporate two characterisations of the term 
holistic; 1) An interpretation that pays due respect to all the key elements enshrined in 
Article 31.1; 2) An interpretation that gives meaning and effect to all the terms of a 
treaty. 
 The three key principles of Article 31.1 – good faith, ordinary meaning, context 
and object and purpose - are understood to be of equal value in the interpretative 
                                                 
47
 WTO, ‘Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health – Adopted on 14 November 2001’ (20 
November 2001) WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 [5(a)]. See also the Doha Ministerial Declaration which requires 
the Council for TRIPS, in pursuing its work programme, to be guided by Articles 7 and 8.  WTO, 
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process with neither principle taking precedence over the other.
48
 Therefore the correct 
interpretative approach makes an integrated analysis of all the required elements. This 
holistic approach to Article 31 has been confirmed by Appellate Body. 
49
 In fact, it has 
more recently acknowledged that the rules and principles of treaty interpretation are 
‘connected and mutually reinforcing components of a holistic exercise’ such that ‘the 
enterprise of interpretation is intended to ascertain the proper meaning of the provision; 
one that fits harmoniously with the terms, context and object and purpose of the 
treaty.’50  
 That being said, it is clear that good faith has an overarching role within Article 31 
and its application within the WTO. Good faith indicates to the interpreter how the 
function is to be carried out.
51
 It has been described by the Panel as ‘a core principle of 
interpretation of the WTO Agreement’52 and by the Appellate Body as ‘inform[ing] a 
treaty interpreter’s task.’53 The pre-eminence of good faith is maintained by its primary 
position within the General Rule of Interpretation in Article 31 – A treaty shall be 
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interpreted in good faith....
54
 This ensures that it has application across the entire 
interpretative process informing considerations of ordinary meaning, object and 
purpose, and subsequent developments between the parties.
55
 Moreover, an 
interpretation that gives effect to all the principles enshrined in Article 31.1 of the 
Vienna Convention can be described as an interpretation in accordance with the ‘good 
faith’ principle. This is a characterisation of holistic that can be described as ‘good 
faith’ interpretation and thus in accordance with Article 7.  
 A second characterisation of holistic interpretation in good faith can also be 
identified. From the very beginnings of the Vienna Convention, good faith 
interpretation, in accordance with the other elements expressed within Article 31.1, has 
been linked to other interpretative principles, most notably that of effectiveness (ut res 
magis valeat quam pereat).
56
 This has allowed a general understanding to be drawn as 
to the content of interpretative good faith. ‘Effective’ interpretation is seen as one which 
gives meaning and effect to all terms of a treaty. It is a principle that has been 
acknowledged by the WTO: - 
A fundamental tenet of treaty interpretation flowing from the general rule of 
interpretation set out in Article 31 is the principle of effectiveness (ut res 
magis valeat quam pereat).  In United States - Standards for Reformulated 
and Conventional Gasoline, we noted that "[o]ne of the corollaries of the 
‘general rule of interpretation’ in the Vienna Convention is that interpretation 
must give meaning and effect to all the terms of the treaty.  An interpreter is 
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 Villiger (n 39) 425. 
55
 Sinclair (n 36) 120; Villiger (n 39) 426; Gardiner (n 50) 148. 
56
 ILC (n 35) 219 [6]. For a brief discussion on the negotiating history in relation to the principle of 
effectiveness see Gardiner (n 50) 149-150. 
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not free to adopt a reading that would result in reducing whole clauses or 
paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility".
57
 
 
Hence, an interpretation that does not appreciate the holistic nature of a treaty, by 
ignoring provisions or failing to adequately interpret their relevance, may be identified 
as an interpretation that has not made in good faith.
58
  
 As noted by the Appellate Body above, the good faith corollary of effective 
interpretation is taken to emanate from Article 31.1 of the Vienna Convention. It has 
been directly linked to other elements of Article 31.1 specifically that of object and 
purpose. As noted in the Summary Records of the International Law Commission, an 
interpretation that is made in good faith and takes full account of the object and purpose 
of a treaty will logically always give meaning and effect to the text.
59
 Consequently, the 
two facets of holistic interpretation – all the elements of Article 31.1 applied to all the 
elements of a treaty – are interrelated such that interpretative practice that fails to 
consider a treaty’s object and purpose would implicitly run counter to the principle of 
effectiveness and thus good faith. However, this is not to suggest that the International 
Law Commission or the WTO support use of Article 31.1 to encourage a true 
                                                 
57
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teleological approach to interpretation.
60
 The text of the treaty, in reflecting the 
common intentions of the parties, is of primary importance. Nevertheless, its ordinary 
meaning can only be established in light of a wider analysis of context, and object and 
purpose.
61
  
 Returning to the TRIPS Agreement, it is fair to say that WTO tribunals have often 
failed to give full effect to ‘good faith’ interpretation. There has been a clear tendency 
to ignore key elements of the General Rule of interpretation as articulated in Article 
31.1, which thereby results in sections of the TRIPS Agreement being reduced to 
inutility, in particular Articles 7 and 8. Despite being asked to directly engage with the 
all aspects of Article 31.1 of the Vienna Convention, in particular the ‘object and 
purpose’ of the TRIPS Agreement, the Panel in Canada - Pharmaceuticals made, what 
is generally perceived to be, an inadequate application of the principles of treaty 
interpretation.
62
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  This dispute centred around two sections of the Canadian Patent Act, in force at the 
time. The first provision allowed third parties to carry out experiments on 
pharmaceutical products in order to gain regulatory approval for generic versions that 
were to be marketed on expiry of the patent.
63
 The second allowed third parties to 
manufacture and stock pile patented products for a period of six months prior to the 
expiry of the patent.
64
  In bringing the dispute, the EU argued that the Canadian patent 
regime breached several obligations of the TRIPS Agreement including the anti-
discrimination rule in Article 27, the rights conferred on the patent owner in Article 
28.1, and the term of patent protection required by Article 33.
65
  
 In response Canada maintained that these two provisions were legitimate 
exceptions authorised by the TRIPS Agreement, as they complied with the three criteria 
established by Article 30: - 
i) the exception must be ‘limited’;  
ii) the exception must not ‘unreasonably conflict with the normal 
exploitation of the patent’;  
                                                 
63
 Section 55.2(1) of the Patent Act. 
64
 Section 55.2(2) of the Patent Act in conjunction with the ‘Manufacturing and Storage of Patented 
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65
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iii) the exception must not ‘unreasonably prejudice the legitimate 
interests of the patent owner, taking into account the legitimate 
interests of third parties.’66 
 
Canada asserted that in interpreting Article 30, in accordance with the rule of treaty 
interpretation stated in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention, particular attention 
should be given to Articles 7, 8.1, 1.1 and the first recital in the Preamble to the TRIPS 
Agreement.
67
  
 Despite this request, the Panel failed to make use of these important interpretative 
resources contained within the TRIPS Agreement itself, in particular Articles 7 and 8. 
To fully appreciate how the WTO directly undermines the application of this main 
source of interpretative guidance it is necessary to review that Panel’s approach in 
Canada-Pharmaceuticals and then consider how this could and should be rectified in 
the upcoming dispute against Australia – challenging rules mandating plain packaging 
for all tobacco products.   
 In Canada - Pharmaceuticals the Panel, in its interpretation  of Article 30, chose to 
focus upon the impact the exception had upon the rights holder rather than make an 
analysis of the wider object and purpose of the Agreement, as incorporated inter alia 
within Articles 7 and 8.
68
 This seems at odds with the very nature of an ‘exception’ 
                                                 
66
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67
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68
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which must exist only because there are other interests which take precedence over the 
interests of the patentee.
69
 Therefore, the nature of Article 30 required the Panel to 
examine the object and purpose of the Agreement to ascertain what interests might take 
priority.  
 The next appropriate application for object and purpose came when the Panel 
started to analyse the specific criteria governing the application of exceptions to patent 
rights. As mentioned above, Article 30 establishes three criteria that must be satisfied 
for an exception to be legitimate – it must be ‘limited’; not ‘unreasonably conflict with 
the normal exploitation of the patent’; and not ‘unreasonably prejudice the legitimate 
interests of the patent owner.’ If the Panel had taken an interest in the object and 
purpose of the Agreement, and thus Articles 7 and 8, many of the elements included in 
these provisions may have influenced the reasoning and maybe even the decision. 
Phrases such as ‘mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge’ 
and ‘in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare’ together with the ability to 
‘adopt measures to protect public health and nutrition and to promote public interest in 
sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological development’ 
should have required the Panel to pay attention not only to ‘how much the rights holder 
might lose’ but ‘how much society might gain, from a given exception.’70 Interests of 
public health, those of the user of protected technologies together with the interests of 
the patentee are all ‘legitimate interests’ in the eyes of the TRIPS Agreement that 
warrant appropriate consideration.   
 From this brief analysis it is evident that the interpretation by the Panel does not 
reflect the above definition of a good faith interpretation. First, by ignoring these 
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provisions the Panel is failing to follow accepted interpretative practice as required by 
Article 3.2 of the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding. The ‘General Rule of 
Interpretation’ requires a holistic analysis of all the stated elements – including object 
and purpose. In fact, rather than look to the object and purpose for interpretative 
guidance, the Panel had direct recourse to the negotiating history of the TRIPS 
Agreement and even the Berne Convention to identify the ordinary meaning of the 
text.
71
  
 Secondly, by ignoring Articles 7 and 8 in the interpretative process risks making 
these provisions obsolete. If they have no role to play as object and purpose then it is 
natural to reach the conclusion that they have no meaning within the TRIPS 
Agreement.
72
 Such an approach fails to appreciate the holistic nature of treaties and 
runs counter to the principle of effectiveness. As noted by Carlos Correa, ‘If the 
Agreement itself contains a definition of its purpose, as Article 7 does, panels and the 
Appellate Body cannot ignore it or create their own definition in interpreting other 
provisions of the Agreement.’73  
 Despite, 1) the Panel’s confirmation that ‘Both the goals and the limitations stated 
in Articles 7 and 8.1 must obviously be borne in mind’ when giving meaning to other 
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement; 2) the Appellate Body’s acknowledgement that 
these provisions ‘still await appropriate interpretation’; and 3) the Ministerial 
Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health sanctioning their use as object and purpose, 
                                                 
71
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there has been no subsequent use of Articles 7 and 8 in this context.
74
 This may be 
because the authority of the Ministerial Declaration is seen only to exist in relation to 
public health and this issue has not been raised before the Panel or Appellate Body 
since Canada – Pharmaceuticals.75 An alternate explanation may be that the full effect 
of the Panel’s correlation between Article 7 and the principle of good faith in US – s211 
has yet to be fully appreciated, given that the Appellate Body did not directly address 
the issue when it reversed the Panel on many of its key findings.   
 However, the first real opportunity for a WTO tribunal  to revisit this  
interpretative approach, in light of the Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, may be 
about to present itself.
76
 Fertile ground for the application of good faith interpretation, 
in a public health context, can be found in the five complaints currently filed against 
Australia and its 2011 legislation on plain packaging for tobacco products.
77
  Ukraine, 
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Honduras, Dominican Republic, Cuba and Indonesia each claim that Australian law, 
requiring all tobacco products to be sold in plain packaging, is in violation of several 
trade mark obligations in the TRIPS Agreement.
78
 In particular, these countries 
complain that Australian law renders ineffective the trade mark rights of individuals by 
creating an unjustifiable encumbrance on the use of the marks, which thereby 
discriminates against tobacco related trade marks and the owners’ legitimate rights79. 
 However, like the patent section, the trade mark section of the TRIPS Agreement 
contains a provision which authorises legitimate exceptions to the granted rights. 
Article 17 closely resembles the wording of Article 30 and requires that any exception 
must be ‘limited’ and ‘take account of the legitimate interests of the owner of the 
trademark and of third parties’. In addition, Article 20 prevents special requirements 
being placed on the use of a mark only to the extent that they are considered 
‘unjustifiabl[e] encumb[rances]’. As argued above, in interpreting the scope of any 
TRIPS provision, the WTO tribunal is under a good faith obligation to have full regard 
to the object and purpose of the Agreement as contained within Articles 7 and 8.  
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Given the public health nature of this dispute, the TRIPS Agreement should be 
construed ‘in a manner that is conducive to social and economic welfare’ (Article 7), 
and to acknowledge that ‘Members may adopt measure necessary to protect public 
health... provided such measures are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement’ 
(Article 8).
80
 Here the ‘consistency’ requirement places what appears to be a significant 
constraint on national autonomy. Yet, if we analyse the consistency requirement of 
Article 8 in light of the conditions placed upon the grant of the limitations and 
exceptions to the exclusive rights, we can see that ‘inconsistency’ may, in fact, be hard 
to establish given the ambiguous nature of these provisions.  For example, Article 17 
requires that any exception to trade marks rights must ‘take account of the legitimate 
interests of the owners of the trade mark and of third parties.’ Here the interests of 
others are a key factor in determining the legitimacy of an exception. However, there is 
no explicit mention of nature and extent of the relevant third party interests. Yet, in 
light of the terms of Articles 7 and 8, it would seem illogical to suppose that the 
consistency requirement should prevent Member States from taking action to protect 
public health.
81
  
The consistency requirement is there not because negotiators intended IP rights to 
trump other national policies, but as an indicator that there is sufficient room within the 
other provisions of the TRIPS Agreement, including the exceptions, to accommodate 
those policies. In which case, the consistency requirement, if interpreted in light of the 
object and purpose of the Agreement, skews in favour of the wider public interest when 
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it comes into conflict with intellectual property rights. Public Health is a legitimate 
public policy objective that should not be subordinated to private rights of intellectual 
property owners. If an exception is required, then a good faith interpretation, in 
accordance with Articles 7 and 8, should seek to encompass a broader range of third 
party interests and not focus entirely upon the impact of a measure on the IP rights of 
individuals, as was the case in Canada-Pharmaceuticals.  
 This dispute presents many complex issues concerning the scope of trade mark 
rights, which it is impossible to consider in detail here. However, the nature of the 
complaint, in pitting intellectual property rights against national public health 
objectives, provides the perfect opportunity for the Panel to consider the relevance of 
the object and purpose of the Agreement as expressed in Articles 7 and 8. The public 
health context also underscores the significance of the Ministerial Declaration on 
TRIPS and Public Health (which sanctioned the use of Articles 7 and 8 as object and 
purpose) and will allow the Panel to determine its relevance for the interpretative 
process. Much is riding on the outcome of this dispute, with many WTO Members, 
including New Zealand,
82
 the United Kingdom
83
, and the European Union,
84
  debating 
the possibility of following Australia’s lead and introducing plain packaging for all 
tobacco related products. Therefore, it is important that the Panel engage fully with the 
object and purpose of the TRIPS Agreement to ensure that it provides a good faith 
interpretation of the text.   
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 Article 7 seeks to deliver ‘a balance of rights and obligations’ for its Members. 
Whilst the obligation to provide adequate protection for intellectual property rights so 
as to ‘reduce distortions and impediments to trade’ is fundamental to the TRIPS 
Agreement, it has to be balanced against Members’ right to take measures to protect  
other important public interests, such as public health.  These competing objectives and 
purposes are actually preserved within Articles 7 and 8 themselves and good faith 
demands that they receive appropriate attention, at the very least, through the 
application of object and purpose and the principle of effectiveness as enshrined within 
Article 31.1 of the Vienna Convention.    
 Having analysed the regulatory and interpretative expressions of good faith 
enshrined within the Vienna Convention and accepted by the WTO as authoritative 
WTO jurisprudence, it is necessary to look beyond the codification of the good faith 
principle and ask to what extent WTO jurisprudence accepts good faith as a ‘general 
principle’ of WTO law? - The wider the impact of the good faith principle the greater 
the relevance of Article 7. However, in its role as a general principle of law good faith 
becomes a rather nebulous concept with ill-defined boundaries.
85
 This is partly due to 
disagreement as to which principles are considered corollaries of good faith
86
 and partly 
due to its link with rather vague concepts such as fairness, honesty, reasonableness and 
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morality.
87
  Defining the scope of the general principle of good faith is therefore beyond 
the scope of this work. Hence the following will not argue that Article 7, as a form of 
the good faith principle, is a source of all such emanations of the principle into the 
TRIPS Agreement. However, it will focus on accepted good faith jurisprudence of the 
WTO and seek to define its relevance for Article 7. This will include an analysis of the 
doctrine of abus de droit and the principle of legitimate expectations.  
 
C. Abus de Droit  
 
As recognised by the Appellate Body in US- Shrimp and acknowledged by the Panel in 
US – s211, the doctrine of ‘abuse of rights’ is a tangible  application of the general 
principle of good faith
88
 that ‘prevents a Party to an agreement from exercising its rights 
in a way that is unreasonable in light of the spirit of the agreement’.89 Cheng associates 
the abuse of rights doctrine with the malicious exercise of rights where the purpose is to 
injury others; the evasion of treaty obligations by feigning the exercise of a right; 
exercising a national right in a way that conflicts with an international treaty obligation 
to another state; and discretionary rights exercised unreasonably, dishonestly and 
without due regard for the interests of others.
90
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 The Appellate Body decision in US – Shrimp has been described as ‘a landmark’, 
being the first express recognition of the doctrine of abus de droit in WTO law.
91
 By 
connecting the doctrine of abus de droit to the substantive exceptions rule contained in 
Article XX of the GATT, the Appellate Body has utilised the doctrine to control the 
exercise of rights by a Member State. In this case, the state’s permissible action in 
exercising an exception was claimed to encroach upon the trading rights of other 
Members enshrined within the GATT.  Consequently, all Member States must execute 
such rights ‘bona fide[s], that is to say reasonably.’92 As noted by the Appellate Body: - 
To permit one Member to abuse or misuse its right to invoke an exception 
would be effectively to allow that Member to degrade its own treaty 
obligations as well as to devalue the treaty rights of other Members.  If the 
abuse or misuse is sufficiently grave or extensive, the Member, in effect, 
reduces its treaty obligation to a merely facultative one and dissolves its 
juridical character, and, in so doing, negates altogether the treaty rights of 
other Members.
93
 
 
 Here the doctrine of abus de droit  takes on a substantive function that seeks to find 
a balance between the effective application of the treaty and the right to exercise certain 
exceptions to the rights and obligations arising under the treaty.  Within the judgement 
it is possible to draw upon dicta that support the use of the doctrine of abus de droit as 
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an autonomous source of legal obligations, albeit implicitly included within the chapeau 
of Article XX of the GATT. For example, ‘An abusive exercise by a Member of its own 
treaty right thus results in a breach of the treaty rights of the other Members and, as 
well, a violation of the treaty obligation of the Member so acting.’94  
 However, the Appellate Body appears to stop short of acknowledging an 
independent legal role for abus de droit by immediately stating that, ‘Having said this, 
our task here is to interpret the language of the chapeau, seeking additional 
interpretative guidance, as appropriate, from the general principles of international 
law.’95 By seemingly stepping back from accepting the substantive relevance of the 
doctrine the Appellate Body may have instead given the first judicial recognition to the 
principle of good faith treaty interpretation, thereby incorporating good faith 
interpretative maxims independent of the holistic approach espoused by Article 31 of 
the Vienna Convention.
96
 Nevertheless, whether as a substantive rule or an 
interpretative tool ‘the approaches may, in the end, be difficult to distinguish in 
practical terms.’97 Either way the actions of the parties to the dispute are measured 
against the principle of good faith as expressed within the doctrine of abus de droit.  
 In US –Shrimp the Appellate Body makes significant inroads into incorporating the 
general principle of good faith into the legal framework of the GATT, even if the actual 
nature of its application is somewhat obscure.
98
  By associating the same principle and 
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reasoning to Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement the significance is replicated within the 
confines of the WTO’s intellectual property law. It is possible to conclude that the 
Panel intended Article 7 (as ‘a form of the good faith principle’) to act as either a 
substantive or interpretative constraint upon Member States, preventing any abuse of 
rights expressly when ‘implement[ing]’ their obligations under the TRIPS Agreement. 
This is a significant development that does not easily succumb to concerns regarding 
judicial activism. As noted by Cottier and Schefer, abus de droit is a judicial construct 
not a doctrine that could readily be considered within the legislative process. Abuse of 
rights requires a fact specific investigation that can only be carried out by the DSB.
99
 In 
this regard it may be said that the judicial organ of the WTO has not exceeded its 
mandate by establishing the relevance of abus de droit within the WTO and, in 
particular, Article 7.   
 Following the lead established by the Appellate Body in US – Shrimp, Article 7 
appears to take on a specific role in the regulation of the TRIPS Agreement. It invokes 
the abuse of rights doctrine to effectuate a balance between the obligations arising 
under the Agreement with the right to invoke exceptions to those obligations. As noted 
by the Appellate Body in US – Shrimp: - 
[W]e consider that [the chapeau of Article XX] embodies the recognition on 
the part of WTO Members of the need to maintain a balance of rights and 
obligations between the right of a Member to invoke one or another of the 
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exceptions of Article XX...on the one hand, and the substantive rights of the 
other Members under the GATT 1994, on the other hand.
100
 
 
Article 7, as a form of the good faith principle, expressly requires that same balancing 
of rights and obligations.
101
  
 However, it must be acknowledged that the Panel in US-s211 and the Appellate 
Body in US- Shrimp utilise the principle of abus de droit as a safeguard against 
arbitrary limitations placed on the substantive rights. Yet, it should not be supposed that 
its only application is to constrain the use of limitations and exceptions to the granted 
rights. As stated above, the abuse of rights doctrine ensures that a balance of rights and 
obligations is maintained. Therefore, not only can the abuse of rights doctrine, as 
articulated within Article 7, be used as a ‘sword’ to review measures that place 
limitations on the granted rights, it can also function as a ‘shield’ to defend against the 
use of such measures. For example, the abuse of rights doctrine could be advanced as a 
defence when action taken to limit the scope of patent rights in pursuit of a public 
health objective is challenged before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. Given that 
Article 8.1 and the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health now allow for 
measures to be taken to protect public health, a defendant could rely on Article 7 to 
argue that the challenger is abusing their right to bring a WTO violation complaint. This 
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would be so unless the challenging Member is able to clearly establish that the measure 
in question was inconsistent with other provisions of the TRIPS Agreement.
102
  
 Consequently, the application of abus de droit within the TRIPS Agreement can be 
seen to encompass the doctrine of abuse of process. This doctrine requires that a 
tribunal should refuse to exercise its jurisdiction where the litigation is brought in 
circumstances that are ‘manipulative and abusive.’103 These include situations ‘where 
the purpose of the litigation is to harass the defendant, or the claim is frivolous or 
manifestly groundless, or the claim is one which could and should have been raised in 
earlier proceedings.’104 
In has been argued that Article 8 of the TRIPS Agreement shifts the burden of 
proving inconsistency with the TRIPS Agreement to the challenging party.
105
 
Accordingly, the challenger must provide sufficient evidence that the public health 
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measure in question is inconsistent with the TRIPS Agreement, or risk having the claim 
thrown out as ‘frivolous or manifestly groundless’ and thus an abuse of process.  
As noted above, inconsistency may be harder to establish than may first appear.
106
 
If interpreted in light of the object and purpose of the Agreement it could reasonably be 
argued that ‘Articles 7 and 8 impose on Members the correlative obligation to refrain 
from questioning of sanctioning those acts of other Members that make use of the 
freedom conferred to them by the said provisions.’107 Nevertheless, claims of ‘frivolous 
or manifestly groundless’ litigation must be grounded in something more definite than 
exception provisions with uncertain scope.  To illustrate this point it is possible to turn, 
once again, to the upcoming WTO litigation surrounding Australia’s law on plain 
packaging for tobacco products in order to observe how the above approach may be 
applied.  
Broadly speaking, academic commentary on the legitimacy of Australia’s law has 
produced two, somewhat distinct, lines of argument.  The first body of opinion debates 
the scope of both Article 17 and 20 of the TRIPS Agreement to determine whether the 
national measures in question can amount to a ‘limited’ exception or be a ‘justifiable 
encumbrance’ upon the owner’s rights.108 This approach accepts that the national 
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measure is doubtless restricting the rights granted under the TRIPS Agreement, yet it 
may be justified in light of these limitations and exceptions that have been placed on the 
trade mark rights. Viewed from this perspective, a challenge to Australia’s tobacco 
legislation is not likely to be perceived as an abuse of WTO rights/process, even though 
Article 8 prima facie provides support for the introduction of such public health 
measures. As noted, the nature of these exception and limitation provisions are just too 
uncertain for Australia to convincingly argue that it has no case to answer.  
The second approach asserts that plain packaging does not even fall within the 
scope of these provisions as intellectual property rights are ‘negative’ not ‘positive’ in 
nature , i.e. a negative right to prevent others from utilising the mark, rather than a 
positive right to exploit it.
109
 Absent any express statement to the contrary, a right to use 
a trade mark cannot be implied into the Agreement. Consequently, as the Australian law 
only restricts use of the mark for public health purposes and does not hinder the 
owner’s ability to prevent others from utilising the mark, it does not fall within the 
scope of the TRIPS Agreement whatsoever and thus does not need to be justified via an 
exception to the granted rights.
110
 This approach provides much firmer ground upon 
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which to argue that the challenging States are abusing their right to bring a violation 
complaint.  It would be feasible for Australia to argue that the challenging States’ 
complaint presents a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the trade mark 
obligations under the TRIPS Agreement and Paris Convention. In so doing, the basis of 
their complaint has no foundation in the Agreement and is thus frivolous or manifestly 
groundless, thereby an abuse of rights and dispute settlement process.  
 While it must be accepted that the divergence of opinion on the nature of the trade 
mark obligations within TRIPS weakens the strength of this argument in this particular 
case, it is clear that the principle of abus de droit as articulated in Article 7 of the 
TRIPS Agreement provides a viable basis for such a claim. Peter Yu observes that 
Article 7, per se, could already function as a ‘shield’ in actions brought to challenge 
State autonomy when it comes to issues of public health and the conflict with 
intellectual property rights.
111
 However, as an expression of the doctrine of abus de 
droit Article 7 articulates an established legal principle, in the context of the TRIPS 
Agreement that the WTO Dispute Settlement Body would appear willing to apply.   
 
D. Legitimate Expectations 
  
As noted, the WTO has accepted the interpretative rule espoused by the Vienna 
Convention as representative of ‘customary rules of interpretation of public 
international law’. Yet, whilst this approach to treaty interpretation is predicated upon 
the need for certainty and predictability which is seen to flow from identifying the 
intentions of the parties as expressed in the agreement, the way it has been applied by 
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the WTO has been criticised for too rigid a reliance upon Article 31. This ultimately 
restricts recourse to other rules of treaty interpretation that might guide the 
interpretative processes and broaden the scope and nature of the WTO’s analysis.112 
Attempts were made in the first TRIPS-related case to introduce interpretative canons 
derived not directly from the constituent elements of Article 31 of the Vienna 
Convention, but from the general principle of ‘good faith interpretation’ itself.113 As 
stated by the Panel in India – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural 
Chemical Products, ‘In our view, good faith interpretation requires the protection of 
legitimate expectations.’114 Whilst the Panel did make reference to Article 31.1 it is 
clear that its analysis did not adopt the holistic approach subsequently advocated by the 
Appellate body in EC-Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts,
115
 but focussed upon the 
requirement of good faith. 
 According to Cottier and Schefer: -  
The principle [of the protection of legitimate expectations] commands that 
if a Party had reason to believe, based on the actions or words of another 
Party, that a situation or occurrence would or would not change in a 
particular manner, the other Party may not change the situation in that 
manner.
116
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The Panel in India – Patents found that ‘the protection of legitimate expectations is 
central to creating security and predictability in the multilateral trading system’ and thus 
‘when interpreting the text of the TRIPS Agreement, the legitimate expectations of 
WTO Members concerning the TRIPS Agreement must be taken into account.’117 In 
examining India’s ‘mailbox’ system for compliance with Articles 63, 70.8, and 70.9 of 
the TRIPS Agreement, the Panel concluded that the system frustrated the legitimate 
expectation of WTO Members by failing to protect equal conditions of competition 
between home nationals and nationals from other Member States.
118
 In addition, the 
system did not offer security and predictability for individuals seeking to preserve the 
novelty and priority of their inventions.
119
  
 The connection between good faith interpretation and the protection of legitimate 
expectations would have been a significant development in the jurisprudence of the 
WTO. It would have indicated a move away from regarding the text of the treaty as the 
definitive record of the intentions and expectations of the parties, to one where the 
judicial enquiry into general principles of law help to shape the content of the WTO 
Agreement.
120
  
 This was a step too far for the Appellate Body who was quick to rein in the Panel. 
The Appellate Body decision plainly indicates that the principle of the protection of 
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legitimate expectations, as derived from the requirement to interpret a treaty in good 
faith, in not an aspect of WTO interpretative practice, at least as far as violation 
complaints are concerned. According to the Appellate Body the Panel had erred in 
adopting legitimate expectations as an interpretative benchmark.
121
 This approach was 
incorrect for two reasons. First, it had introduced principles developed to deal with non-
violation complaints
122
 into a dispute which actually related to a violation complaint 
and into a treaty that expressly excluded the application of such complaints.
123
 
Secondly, with regard to the Panel’s finding that the principle of good faith 
interpretation provided the basis for the protection of legitimate expectations, the 
Appellate Body dismissed such an approach and confirmed that the legitimate 
expectations of the Members are to stem from the language of the treaty itself.
124
 
Accordingly, the Panel had misapplied Article 31 of the Vienna Convention which 
‘neither require nor condone the imputation into a treaty of words that are not there or 
the importation into a treaty of concepts that were not intended.’125 Moreover, Articles 
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3.2 and 19.2 of the DSU require that both the Panel and the Appellate Body ‘must not 
add to or diminish rights and obligations provided in the WTO Agreement.’126 
 Whilst the Appellate Body appeared to curtail the ability of the good faith principle 
to expand the range of interpretative maxims available to the WTO, this has to be 
considered in light of the Appellate Body decision in US - Shrimp, discussed above. 
Here the Appellate Body suggests that good faith interpretation can bring about the 
assimilation of important good faith maxims into the WTO legal system, such as abus 
de droit. However, in the Shrimp case good faith was linked to a specific GATT 
provision; in India – Patents there is no such connection.  Yet, more recent Appellate 
Body jurisprudence appears to accept a more expansive role in that ‘The principle of 
good faith may therefore be said to inform a treaty interpreter's task.’127 Whether such 
acknowledgement signifies a discrete role for interpretative good faith or whether it 
merely reasserts the central role that good faith plays within Article 31.1 of the Vienna 
Convention is not evident from the Appellate Body’s reasoning. Either way the value of 
the principle of good faith is underscored for the interpretative process.   
 Notwithstanding the rejection by the Appellate Body of the principle of good faith 
interpretation as an autonomous source of interpretative principles, it did not dismiss 
entirely the relevance of legitimate expectations for WTO jurisprudence, it only limited 
its role to that of non-violation complaints. However, as mentioned above, the TRIPS 
Agreement has yet to recognise such complaints. There is much debate as to whether it 
would be a suitable Agreement for such disputes, due to, inter alia, its structural nature 
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as a minimum standards agreement,
128
 or because such disputes would act as a further 
restraint on the ability of individual nations to tailor their TRIPS obligations to reflect 
their own national interests.
129
 Yet, in the context of non-violation complaints the 
principle of good faith ‘challenges the concept of the sufficiency of the text of the 
agreement, because it implies that duties not explicitly assumed under the agreement 
may nonetheless be imposed if required by good faith.’130 Here the role of good faith 
and its corollary – legitimate expectations – play a vital role in maintaining expectations 
as to conditions of market access and also reciprocal trade benefits which could be 
imported into the TRIPS Agreement should non-violation disputes be authorised.  
 By connecting Article 7 with the principle of good faith the Appellate Body has 
provided an adequate basis for the incorporation of corollaries of the wider good faith 
principle should non-violation complaints become approved. That being said there is 
some uncertainty as to the legitimacy of this approach for violation complaints. In India 
– Patents the Appellate Body dismissed the relevance of legitimate expectations 
derived from the application of ‘good faith interpretation.’ Yet, in US –Shrimp it may 
be concluded that where the principle of good faith can be linked to a specific provision 
‘good faith interpretation’ may authorise the incorporation of good faith maxims – in 
that case abus de droit. Whilst this approach maintains a connection with the 
authoritative text, it only does so by implication. The actual source of the rule is not the 
covered text but rather a general principle of law, albeit one that the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body deems is implied in the text.   
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IV. WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 
AND ARTICLE 7? 
 
In US-s211 the Panel acknowledged that the phrase ‘the protection and enforcement of 
intellectual property rights should contribute...to a balance of rights and obligations’ 
included in Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement, was an expression of the good faith 
principle.
131
  The potential implications of this decision are extremely important for  the 
TRIPS Agreement.  
 As we have seen, this decision by the Panel immediately introduces legal concepts 
into the TRIPS Agreement that are not explicit within the text.  The Panel itself 
expressly refers to abus de droit and by implication the principle of pacta sunt 
servanda. This alone would be pioneering. Yet the natural correlation between the 
obligation to perform a treaty in good faith – pacta sunt servanda – and the obligation 
to interpret a treaty in good faith automatically brings within the scope of Article 7 
other corollaries of the good faith principle, such as the principle of effectiveness and 
the protection of legitimate expectations. By connecting Article 7 with the principle of 
good faith the Panel incorporates rules derived from general principles of law, whilst at 
the same time maintaining the connection with the negotiated text of the TRIPS 
Agreement. This provides WTO tribunals with a degree of interpretative flexibility 
without overtly exposing themselves to criticism from Member States for appearing to 
‘add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements,’ 
contrary to Article 3.2 of the DSU. Such an approach allows the principle of good faith 
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to act as a complementary rule to the covered text, whilst at the same time providing the 
opportunity for the WTO Dispute Settlement Body to engage with the principle and 
shape its form for the TRIPS context.  
 Good faith within the WTO has yet to become an autonomous source of law and 
thus Article 7 in demanding ‘a balance of rights and obligations’ could never alone 
form the basis of a WTO dispute.  Yet it could bolster the argument where a Member is 
accused of failing to implement correctly other provisions of the Agreement. The Panel 
in US – s211 implies that national intellectual property legislation, in this case laws on 
trade mark ownership, could be subject to a review in accordance with the principle of 
good faith and especially that of abus de droit.  It places a good faith obligation on 
Member States when implementing the TRIPS Agreement and thus renders Article 7 
the source of a substantive, although not independent, norm. Accordingly, Article 7, as 
a vessel for good faith obligations, has the potential to form part of a claim before the 
WTO Dispute Settlement Body where rights or obligations have been implemented in a 
manner inconsistent with the good faith principle.
132
  
 This substantive role for Article 7 is potentially much wider than that of the 
chapeau in Article XX of the GATT. The chapeau, as an expression of the good faith 
principle, only has substantive relevance when considering the general exceptions to the 
GATT trading rules within Article XX. In contrast, Article 7 and its requirement of ‘a 
balance of rights and obligations’ forms part of the ‘General Provisions’ of the TRIPS 
Agreement and has potential application for the whole Agreement. Whilst the balance 
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of intellectual property rights protection with the permitted exceptions will clearly fall 
within the scope of Article 7, there are other aspects of the TRIPS Agreement that also 
necessitate a good faith balancing of rights and obligations. These include, for example, 
Article 1.1 which gives members freedom to determine the appropriate method of 
implementing the provision of the Agreement; Article 31 on compulsory licensing of 
patent rights; and Article 41.2 which requires that procedures concerning enforcement 
shall be fair and equitable.  
 Although these factors point towards an enhanced substantive role for Article 7 
some possible constraints on the function of Article 7 must be highlighted. First, as 
noted in the quotation above, the Appellate Body in US- Shrimp utilises the principle of 
abus de droit to place a check upon the use of exceptions to non-discriminatory trade 
rules contained within Article XX of the GATT.  Here the main priority is to maintain 
as far as possible the legal force of the substantive provisions of the GATT that 
prioritise liberal trade.
133
 Nevertheless the Appellate Body ‘engages in balancing 
tests’134 by discussing the need for: -  
[L]ocating and marking out a line of equilibrium between the right of a 
Member to invoke an exception under Article XX and the rights of the other 
Members under varying substantive provisions (e.g., Article XI) of the 
GATT 1994, so that neither of the competing rights will cancel out the other 
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and thereby distort and nullify or impair the balance of rights and 
obligations constructed by the Members themselves in that Agreement.
135
 
 
This has led Panizzon to hypothesise that ‘it is possible that the AB has wanted to 
soften the harshness and unilateral emphasis on free trade with abus de droit in the 
context of an exception from trade liberalisation rules’. As a tool for invoking the good 
faith principle and abus de droit and creating a ‘balance of rights and obligations’, 
Article 7 has a role to play in finding the appropriate line of equilibrium, albeit possibly 
prejudiced towards prioritising liberal trade. It must be emphasised that the balance 
envisaged by Article 7, in this context, is limited to reconciling the competing rights 
and obligations specifically arising for Member States under the TRIPS Agreement, i.e. 
treaty obligations versus treaty exceptions/limitations/flexibilities, and not to invoking a 
broader range of interests from beyond the WTO texts. However, these wider interests 
can find a voice within the provisions of the Agreement, for example through the 
limitations and exceptions to intellectual property rights provided for in Articles 13, 17, 
30 and 31. In functioning to ensure that these exceptions are implemented by Members 
States in good faith, Article 7 can help to legitimise the integration of a broader range of 
economic and social interests within the context of the TRIPS Agreement. The 
obligation to interpret a treaty in good faith will also facilitate the incorporation of a 
wider range of interests. A holistic analysis of all the elements of Article 31.1 of the 
Vienna Convention together with all the elements of the TRIPS Agreement will ensure 
that the object and purpose of TRIPS as enshrined within Articles 7 and 8 of the 
Agreement become guides to the interpretation of other provisions of the treaty. Health, 
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nutrition, socio-economic development and technology transfer, to name but a few, are 
all expressed within these provisions and become legitimate interests when analysing 
the scope of other provisions of the Agreement.  
 Secondly, on appeal, the Appellate Body in US – s211 did not equate the principle 
of good faith specifically with Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement and the ‘balance of 
rights and obligations’ as expressed. Yet it did indicate that the requirement to 
implement rights and obligations in good faith applies to the WTO Agreement as a 
whole. The Appellate Body stated that ‘it cannot be assumed that the WTO Member will 
fail to implement its obligations under the WTO Agreement in good faith.’136 Yet, a 
presumption in favour of a good faith implementation does not arise without there first 
being a positive duty to implement in good faith. As observed by Panizzon ‘the AB has 
introduced a self-standing obligation to implement all the WTO Agreements in good faith, 
based upon a Panel decision that had applied such a duty to the TRIPS Agreement only.’137 
Therefore, although the Appellate Body decision did not expressly reinforce the 
function of Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement as an expression of the good faith 
principle, it did confirm that a general obligation existed to implement all the WTO 
Agreements in good faith.  
 Following the recognition by the Panel that Article 7 is a form of the good faith 
principle, it has been possible to identify specific understandings to attach to this good 
faith principle and to also determine how this principle may be applied to create an 
impact on the substantive scope of the TRIPS Agreement. Article 7 mandates ‘a balance 
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of rights and obligations’ which imparts a good faith obligation upon those 
implementing the TRIPS Agreement and those interpreting it. As demonstrated in 
relation to the upcoming WTO hearing against Australia, by reversing the interpretative 
approach of the Panel in Canada-Pharmaceuticals and accepting the application of the 
principle of abus de droit, Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement can influence the outcome 
of this high profile dispute and define once and for all the boundary between intellectual 
property rights protection and the protection of public health.   
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
In Canada – Pharmaceuticals the WTO Panel failed to provide an adequate analysis of 
Article 7 and disregarded its interpretative value in defining the object and purpose of 
the TRIPS Agreement. However, in US – s211 the Panel undoubtedly views this 
provision as being of far greater significance for the Agreement. In recognising that ‘the 
protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute...to a 
balance of rights and obligations’ is a form of the good faith principle, the Panel 
acknowledges a legal function for Article 7. It then goes on to identify aspects of the 
good faith principle that Article 7 can be seen to obligate – pacta sunt servanda and its 
derivative abus de droit. In analysing the nature of the good faith principle and its role 
within the WTO, it is possible to conclude that Article 7 will not only facilitate greater 
adherence to good faith implementation and interpretation as a general principle of 
public international law, it will also have a substantive function within the TRIPS 
Agreement, albeit as a subsidiary claim to a violation complaint. This role would also 
 52 
be extended to non-violation complaints should they ever become accepted within the 
context of the TRIPS Agreement. 
 The decision of the Panel not only introduces into the TRIPS Agreement legal 
concepts that do not find themselves expressed in the text, it also obliges ‘a balancing of 
rights and obligations’ that up to this point have been conspicuously absent from the 
reasoning of the WTO tribunals.  This is an important decision the effects of which 
have yet to fully materialise. However, the groundwork has been set for Article 7 and 
the principle of good faith to have a far greater role within the jurisprudence of WTO 
TRIPS Agreement in the very near future. The complaints against Australia and its 
tobacco laws provide the perfect opportunity for the WTO Dispute Settlement Body to 
finally engage with the range of interests clearly identified as the ‘Objectives’ of the 
TRIPS Agreement.  
 
 
 
 
